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Recent studies have concluded that R&D grants can induce firms to export and that 
exporting and innovating can be complementary activities at the firm level. Yet the trade 
literature has paid little attention to the scope of innovation policy as a stimulus to both trade 
and innovation. To investigate this question we rely on a general work-horse model of trade 
and firm heterogeneity with firm investments in R&D activities. The interplay of innovation and 
trade policies uncover novel results. In particular, we show that the effects of either policy 
depend on the degree of protectionism in a country. Therefore, countries can respond 
differently to the same policy, and similarly to different policies. In such a context, different 
governments may face different trade-offs in achieving a given target.  
 
JEL: F12, F13, F15, F61, O32. 
Keywords: innovation, innovation policy, heterogeneous firms, technology adoption, trade 
policy. 
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1  Introduction 
 
All industrialized countries use some measures of innovation policy, like R&D grants and tax 
allowances, to sustain their research activity and economic growth (OECD, 2005). While 
originally aimed at increasing the productivity of firms, these measures have also contributed to 
stimulate the exports of firms (Görg et al., 2008). When trading is the conditio sine qua non for 
innovating, trading and innovating become complementary activities (Lileeva and Trefler, 
2010). The other side of this complementarity is policy substitution: If innovation policy favors 
export initiation by strengthening innovation efforts, it renders trade policies with the same 
objective superfluous, and vice versa. 
 
The importance of policy substitution and, more generally, of policy coordination is 
underrated in the current models of trade with heterogeneous and monopolistically 
competitive firms. Motivated by trade liberalization in several countries, these models have 
offered thorough analysis of the micro effects of these policies, but they have paid little 
attention to the concomitant role of innovation policy for stimulating both trade and 
innovation, which is the focus of this paper. 
 
To explore this topic, we opt for a model with technology adoption, which nests in the 
class of models that have followed the seminal work of Montagna (2001) and Melitz (2003). 
There are several advantages associated with this approach. First, technology adoption is an 
important source of industry productivity growth (Griffith et al., 2004). This suggests that 
innovation policies aiming at promoting technology adoption are relevant from a policy 
perspective. Second, this approach allows us to study the consequences of these policies while 
keeping analytical tractability. Finally, this approach is equally well able to encompass the 
evidence presented in Bustos (2011), featuring a scenario with exporting non-innovators, and 
the evidence from Castellani and Zanfei (2007), featuring a scenario with innovating 
non-exporters. The first scenario occurs in quite open countries, where trade is relatively free, 
so firms can engage in international markets without being innovators. The second scenario is 
common to relatively closed countries, where trade barriers are relatively high, and it therefore 
pays to innovate just for the domestic market. For intermediate levels of trade openness, 
innovation and export activities become complementary, as described in Lileeva and Trefler 
(2010). These scenarios correspond in our model to three distinct equilibria sustained by 
different parameter configurations. 
 
In our policy analysis, it is useful to compare the effects of innovation and trade policies 
on the share of innovators and exporters across all equilibria. This comparison forms the basis 
of our welfare analysis and reveals a number of interesting results. 
 
First, an innovation policy increases the share of innovating firms in all scenarios, as one 
would expect. However, it contracts the share of exporting firms except when trading and 
innovating are complementary activities. Therefore, its scope to support export initiation is 
limited. On the other hand, a reduction in variable trade costs increases both shares for all 




Second, a given policy has different effects in different equilibria. Hence, the impact of 
innovation policies and trade policies depends on the degree of protectionism of a country. This 
means that in different countries, the same policy (e.g., a reduction in variable trade costs, or 
an R&D grant) produces different aggregate outcomes (in terms of changes in the share of 
innovators and exporters). 
 
Third, the aggregate outcomes of distinct polices can coincide across equilibria. This 
implies that liberal countries undergoing reductions in variable trade costs may experience 
similar aggregate effects to the ones encountered by slightly more protectionist countries 
introducing R&D grants. 
 
From the perspective of a cross-country comparison, these results suggest that 
countries can have heterogeneous responses to similar policies, as well as similar responses to 
heterogeneous policies. But they also indicate that policy makers in different countries will be 
facing different policy options and, ultimately, different policy-trade offs. We shall argue that 
the order in which policies are adopted (e.g., policy coordination) can either mitigate or 
accentuate the occurrence of trade-offs. 
 
To simplify the presentation of our results, we first describe the effects of various 
policies and analyze the trade-offs that arise with multiple instruments, taking each policy as a 
fait accompli (positive analysis). Then we present the normative implications of these policies 
to justify government interventions. Finally, we show that the policy conclusions drawn are 
robust to the presence of spillovers, recognizing that the reasons for resorting to these types of 
policies originate from market failures caused by spillovers associated with either the 
innovation or the exporting activity. 
 
Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present our research in the context of 
the trade literature. We proceed by presenting our model and deriving the equilibrium in a 
closed and an open economy in section 3. Section 4 briefly outlines the closed economy. In 
section 5 we then analyze the implications of trade and innovation policies in the open 
economy and synthesize our results by means of one simple graph, our policy space. This graph 
illustrates our discussion of the issue of policy coordination in section 6. Sections 7, 8, and 9 
round up our policy discussion. They introduce, respectively, the macro-implications of our 
policies on the industry productivity growth, the welfare analysis of our policies, and the 
presence of innovation and exporting spillovers in the economy. Section 10 concludes. 
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2  The background 
 
Given the increasing availability of micro-datasets linked to trade statistics, firm-heterogeneity 
and its effects have been an important part of recent trade research.
1
 The seminal works of 
Montagna (2001) and Melitz (2003) have been extended to include process innovation besides 
product innovation. Navas and Sala (2007) and Bustos (2011) consider a firm's technology 
adoption as a form of process innovation, whereas Atkeson and Burstein (2010) focus on a 
firm's R&D's investments. The main reason why the literature has focused on process 
innovation, and in the case of Navas and Sala (2007) or Bustos (2011) on technology adoption, 
is that both are important sources of industry productivity growth. Doms and Bartelsman 
(2000) and Foster et al. (2001) provide empirical support that innovation by incumbents 
accounts for the largest proportion of industrial productivity growth. Akcigit and Kerr (2010), 
using the US Census of Manufacturing Firms, find that old and large firms mainly undertake 
innovations whose aim is to encourage productivity improvements, while new and small firms 
perform product innovation. In the same direction, Griffith et al. (2004) conclude that around 
50 per cent of the total contribution of R&D to productivity growth is accounted by technology 
diffusion in OECD countries. In addition, Bustos (2011) and Bas and Ledezma (2010) find the 
trade trade liberalization has induced Argentinean and Chilean exporters to upgrade their 
technology. Greenaway and Kneller (2007) reinforce this result by presenting further evidence 
from studies in other countries. 
 
However, all these models are hardly reconcilable with the evidence disclosed in Lileeva 
and Trefler (2010), as they cannot possibly predict the behavior of some Canadian firms that 
have both upgraded their technologies and simultaneously started to export with the creation 
of the US-Canada free trade area. Our work shows that the limitation of these models with 
regard to encompassing these facts rather originates in neglecting that different parameter 
configurations lead to different types of equilibria. 
 
We consider a simple framework in which firms pay a fixed cost to introduce a new 
technology that reduces the marginal cost in a fixed proportion. Because the reduction in the 
marginal cost is proportional, firms will experience heterogeneous innovation gains. While this 
approach departs from more complex innovation technologies (Atkeson and Burstein, 2010; 
Long et al., 2011), its analytical tractability allows us to introduce the important issue of policy 
coordination that arises when a broad range of instruments are available to policy makers. The 
discussion of this matter is based on a comparative static analysis of our steady states and 
consequently we do not explore the transitional dynamics as in Costantini and Melitz (2007) of 
alternative tariff scenarios. Finally, our model suggests that extending the type of 
counterfactual analysis presented in Corcos et al. (2011) to innovation policy scenarios could be 
fruitful. 
 
To present our model in the next section, we build on Navas and Sala (2007). 
 
                                                     
1
 See Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for an extensive review of this literature. 
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A continuum of households of measure L  have preferences described by a standard C.E.S. 
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The amount of labor required to produce a quantity )(q  of variety   is  
 
 ),(=)(  cqfl D   
where Df  is the fixed labor requirement, and c Î 0,céë ùû is the firm-specific marginal labor 
requirement. 
 
Entry ʹ exit 
 
There is a large (unbounded) pool of prospective entrants into the industry, and prior to entry 
all firms are identical. Like in Melitz (2003), to enter the industry, a firm must make an initial 
investment, modeled as a fixed cost of entry 0>Ef  measured in labor units, which is 
thereafter sunk. An entrant then draws a labor-per-unit-output coefficient c  from a known 
and exogenous distribution with cdf )(cG  and density function )(cg  on the support
c Î 0,céë ùû. Upon observing this draw, a firm may decide to exit or to produce. If the firm does 
not exit, it bears the fixed overhead labor costs, Df , and it has the option to improve on its 
technology. By investing If  units of labor, it can adopt a more productive technology and 
produce at a lower cost gc ( 1)< . Ultimately, the firm faces a choice between a well 
established "baseline" technology - characterized by low implementation costs, normalized to 
0, and variable costs of production c  - and an innovative one - featuring lower variable costs  
(gc), but higher fixed costs of adoption ( If ).2  
 
We assume that technological uncertainty and heterogeneity of the Melitz-type relates 
                                                     
2
 This two-step structure allows us to interpret a broader range of innovation processes. It recalls the distinction introduced by Vernon (1966) 
between a flexible technology adopted by firms in the early stage of the product cycle and a mass production technology adopted in the 
successive phases of the product cycle to output greater volumes of production. Along similar lines, Lileeva and Van Biesebroeck (2010) 
describe a shift from flexible technologies for multiple product lines to less flexible mass technologies for narrower product lines as the scale of 
production increases. We are thankful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation. 
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to what we have called a "baseline" technology, reflecting that firms have to learn about their 
market and their productivity before they can plan to improve it. Having found out about their 
idiosyncratic productivity, all firms can costly adopt an alternative technology, what we have 
referred to as the "innovative" one. While the fixed cost of implementation is the same for each 
firm, the reduction in variable cost is proportional to the firm's intrinsic marginal cost. Since the 
Melitz-type entry leads to productivity heterogeneity, the option to adopt is differently 
attractive to firms with different intrinsic marginal costs. This could be rationalized as some 
firms being more successful than others in implementing the new technology (i.e. better 
implementation makes new technologies more productive).
3
 Therefore, in this paper process 
innovation consists in adopting a technology that is "new to the firm" but not to the industry, as 
both technologies are equally available in all periods. However, adopting firms need to master 
the new technology and face specific learning curves. This yields equilibria that reproduce the 
real fact of non-innovating exporters and innovating non-exporters.  
 
Finally, as in Melitz (2003), every incumbent faces a constant (across productivity levels) 




We shall assume that the economy under study can trade with other 1n  symmetric 
countries. Trade is, however, not free, but involves both fixed and variable costs: the firm has to 
ship 1>  units of a good for each unit to arrive at a destination and has to incur a fixed cost 
Xf  during the period in which starts exporting.  
 
The symmetry of countries ensures that factor price equalization holds, and all countries 
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is the price index of the economy. 
 
Facing this demand function, a producer of variety   with labor output coefficient c  
                                                     
3
 "Technology implementation processes" are in the data the main source of site-to-site variations in the success of the adopter. See Comin 
and Hobijn (2007) and Bikson et al. (1987). Note that in this framework the productivity ratio of two firms with different intrinsic marginal costs 
will be constant if both firms adopt the new technology. 
4
 This is a technical assumption to preserve the model tractability and a widely used assumption in the literature. The model is therefore most 
appropriate for trade between similar countries, which still constitutes the major part of total world trade flows. The formulation in Montagna 
(2001) allows for a non-symmetric G but marginal costs follow a specific functional form. 
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  (2) 
where w  is the common wage rate, hereafter taken as the numeraire ( 1=w ).5  
 
If the firm has opted for the innovative technology, it charges the lower price, 
pI (c) =gpD(c) . Therefore, the profits that firm type D  (producer with a "traditional" 










  (3) 
 p I (c) =
rI (c)
s
- fD - d fI = B(gc)
1- s - fD - d fI  (4) 
where )(crs  is the revenue of firm type s   ID, , d fI  is the per-period amortized 
















B  is a constant from the prospective of a 
single producer.  
 
It is worth noting that rI (c) / rD(c)  >1/g , and therefore the income of the firm 
increases more than proportionally following the introduction of process innovations. 
 
The imported products are more expensive than domestically produced goods due to 
transportation costs. The effective consumer price for a variety shipped from abroad by a 
non-innovating exporter is pX (c) = t pD(c), and by a firm adopting the innovative technology it 
is pXI (c) =gpX (c) . Therefore, the profits of an exporter (firm type X ) and an 
innovator-exporter (firm type XI ) earned on the foreign market are, respectively, 
 pX (c) = t
1- s Bc1- s - d fX and (5) 
 pXI (c) = (g t)
1- s Bc1- s - d fX,  (6) 
where d fX  is the amortized per-period fixed cost of the overhead fixed cost Xf  that firms 
have to pay to export.  
 
As in Melitz (2003), no firms will ever export without also producing for its domestic 
market, and a firm will either export to all n  countries in every period or never export. (5) is 
therefore the profit from exporting conditional on being a domestic firm and, likewise, (6) is the 
profit from exporting conditional on being a domestic innovator.  
  
                                                     
5
 Alternatively, a freely traded homogeneous good produced under constant returns to scale could be introduced as the numeraire good to set 
the wage to unity in all countries. 
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4  Equilibrium in a closed economy 
 
The equilibrium entry cost cut-off 0c  and innovation cost cut-off Ic  must satisfy  
 pD(c0) = 0ÛB c0( )
1- s
= fD  (7) 
 p I (cI ) = pD(cI )Û (g
1- s - 1)B cI( )
1- s
=d fI.  (8) 
 
To close the model and determine the two equilibrium cost cut-offs 0c  and Ic , as well 
as B  and the number of incumbent firms M , free entry into the market and a stability 
condition are imposed additionally. Free entry (henceforth FE) ensures that firms equate the 
per-period expected profit from entry to the equivalent amortized per-period entry cost,  







The stationary-equilibrium condition,  
 MeG(c0) =dM, 
requires the aggregate variables to remain constant over time, as the mass of successful 
entrants, )( 0cGMe , exactly replaces the mass, dM , of incumbents who are hit by the bad 
shock and exit.  
 
Combining (7) with (8), we have the relation between the innovation and the entry 
cut-off  
 (cI )
1- s = d fI




1- s = Y (c0)
1- s ,  (9) 
where 
d fI
g1- s - 1
 is the cost-to-benefit ratio of innovation. It follows that a necessary and 
sufficient condition for having selection into the innovation status is 1> , which is assumed 
to hold throughout since the empirical evidence suggests that only a subset of more productive 




Finally, we note that the entry productivity cut-off level is higher in our economy than in 
Melitz (2003).
7
 The possibility to innovate allows the most efficient firms that perform process 
innovation to "steal" market share from the least efficient firms for which it is harder to survive 
in the market. Consequently, our economy is more efficient, because some varieties are 
produced at a lower cost, but less varied because some varieties have disappeared. This 
trade-off has been well emphasized in the growth literature (see Peretto, 1999, and more 
recently Gustafsson and Segerstrom, 2010). 
  
                                                     
6
 See for instance Parisi et al. (2006) for evidence on Italian firms and Baldwin et al. (2004) for evidence on Canada. 
7
 The proof of this result has been left to an online appendix. 
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5  The open economy 
 
To differentiate the entry cut-off and the innovation cut-off from the ones in the closed 





on the relative position of the cut-offs for innovation and exporting, firms select into these 
activities differently. 
 
Guided by her empirical results, Bustos (2011) focuses only on one possible selection, 
namely fX
f
I ccc 0<< , so that the marginal innovating firm is an exporter and responds to tariff 
cuts with the adoption of a better technology. We label this kind of selection equilibrium BW to 
point to the fact that the growth of the industry productivity has two sources. One, as in Melitz 
(2003), comes from the reallocation of market shares from low to high productivity firms 
induced by the selection effect of trade. The second comes from the adoption of better 
technologies by firms that trade. In its decomposition of the industry productivity growth, 
Bartelsman et al. (2004) refer to the first source as the between variation and to the the second 
source as the within variation. The letters BW (between-within) indicate that in this type of 
equilibrium both sources of variation are present.  
 
However, an equilibrium where both exporters and non-exporters are performing 
innovation is also plausible and requires ffIX ccc 0<<  (see Castellani and Zanfei, 2007 for 
some evidence). In this equilibrium, the marginal innovating firm is not an exporter, and 
therefore it does not respond to a fall in transportation costs with the adoption of innovative 
technologies. We label this selection equilibrium B, as only the between variation contributes to 
the growth of the industry aggregate productivity. 
 
In the limiting case of both these selections, firms engage either in both activities or 
neither of them ( ffIX ccc 0<= ). In this equilibrium, trade and innovation become 
complementary activities (henceforth selection C ), consistently with the evidence presented 
in Lileeva and Trefler (2010).
9 
 
In what follows, we analyze each equilibrium separately, describing which are the 
effects of both innovation and trade policies on the innovation and export activities of firms.  
In particular, the focus of our analysis is on the outcome of these policies, taking them as a "fait 
accompli" (i.e., positive analysis). Abstracting in the first place from the reasons for why these 
reforms are implemented permits the simplest discussion of the interactions among these 
policies. At the end of the paper, we return to the normative implications and show that these 
policies are welfare enhancing. Therefore, governments aiming at increasing countries' welfare 
have a rationale for introducing them. 
 
                                                     
8
 With a slight abuse of notation, we keep denoting the aggregate variables Q, R, and B with the same letter as in the closed economy, 
although their equilibrium value in the two equilibria will generally differ. 
9
 We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this possibility. 
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We consider only stationary equilibria in the sense that all aggregate variables are 
constant over time. We therefore impose on each equilibrium the stationary condition 
 dM =MeG(c0
f ), (10) 
so that the firms exiting the market are just replaced by the new entrants. 
 
 
5.1  Selection BW 
 
We start by determining the equilibrium cost cut-offs for, respectively, market entry, exporting, 
and innovating. Given that in equilibrium BW  we have fX
f
I ccc 0 , the cost cut-offs must 
satisfy the following conditions: 
 pD(c0) =0ÛB(c0
f )1- s = fD  (11) 
 pX (cX ) = 0Û BcX
1- s = d fX
t 1- s
 (12) 
 p I (cI
f )+np XI (cI
f ) = pD(cI
f )+npX (cI
f )Û B cI
f( )1- s = d fIg1- s - 1( ) 1+nt 1- s( ) . (13) 
 
The parameter restriction that sustains this equilibrium and will be important for our 
policy analysis below is 
 
d fI
g1- s - 1( )
1
1+nt 1- s( ) ³ d fXt
s -1 ³ fD. (14) 
 

















ò(p I (c)+np XI (c))dG(c) =d fE  (15) 
together with the stationary condition (10) close the model to determine B  and M . 
 
To compare the share of innovating firms in the trading equilibrium and in the autarky 
equilibrium, we rewrite the innovation cut-off as a function of the entry cut-off,  
 (cI
f )1- s = d fI




f( )1- s ,  (16) 
and note that this relation differs from equation (9) only by the term )1/(1 1  n . This term 
represents the increase in variable profit associated with the fact that in free trade the 
innovation is used in each of the foreign markets that becomes available after autarky is 
abandoned. Looking at equation (16), free trade affects the innovation cut-off in two opposing 
ways: It pushes this term below the unity value of the closed economy (e.g., set 0=n  or 
 ), but it also lowers fc0  below the closed economy threshold 0c , as import 
 11 
competition intensifies and the least productive firms strive to survive in the industry.
10
 In the 
appendix, we prove that the first effect prevails and trade enlarges the share of the innovating 
firm (i.e., I
f
I cc  ). Crucial to this result is the selection of firms into exporting activities. In the 
absence of the fixed costs of trading ( 0=Xf ), all firms would export as in Krugman's (1979) 
model. With CES preferences, the increased revenue from increased sales abroad induced by 
trade opportunities would be exactly offset by the loss of domestic revenues due to increased 
import competition from foreign varieties, so the two opposing effects would exactly equal out. 
Given that profits would be unchanged, no firms would exit the market. Without exit, there is 
no reallocation of market share to exporters. With unchanged output and market share the 
incentive to adopt a more efficient technology in free trade is also unchanged relative to the 
autarky equilibrium. 
 
While this result is the same as in Bustos (2011), we show that it is more general 
because it is derived without assuming that G  is Pareto. 
 
We now examine "incremental" trade liberalization, intended as a reduction of either 
the transportation cost,  , or the regulatory cost of trade, Xf . We summarize the effects of 
these policies on the export and innovation cut-offs in Table 1. The table reveals that only the 
reduction of the variable trade costs is comparable to the case of free trade in that it affects the 
extensive margin of both exporting and innovating positively (see the appendix for a formal 
proof). The reduction of Xf , on the contrary, contracts the extensive margin of innovation. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
 
This is because only a cut in transportation costs increases the variable profits of all 
exporting firms, while a fall in Xf  cannot alter the profits of incumbent exporters (who have 
already incurred these costs). So, when transportation costs decline, all exporters can lower 
prices and increase sales abroad (the intensive margin adjustment). This helps some of the 
non-innovator exporters to start innovating (higher 
f
Ic ). Moreover, because selling 
internationally has become cheaper, exporting becomes attractive to some domestic firms 
(higher Xc ). The increase in innovation or export at the extensive margin raises labor demand 
and the real wage. The firms most hurt are the domestic ones that cannot compensate the 
increased costs of production with the expansion of foreign activity. The least productive are 
therefore forced to exit (lower fc0 ), and their market share is redistributed to all incumbent 
firms. The reallocation process sees high productivity firms expanding, and low productivity 
firms shrinking. When a reduction of Xf  occurs, selling internationally becomes also less 
expensive and the relatively more productive domestic firms engage in international markets 
(higher Xc ). New exporters bid up the price of the scarce labor input, but this time 
innovator-exporter and domestic firms alike cannot compensate for higher costs of production 
                                                     
10
 Notice that we can express c0
f( )1- s = ( fD / B) , where B is constant from the firm's point of view. An increase in competition will push 
this constant down so that the productivity survival threshold will go up. 
 12 
with an expanding business abroad. Then, some of the innovator-exporters can no longer afford 
both activities (i.e., innovation cut-off decreases) and some domestic firms exit (i.e., entry 
cut-off is lower). 
 
Table 1 also emphasizes a similarity in this equilibrium between the effects of a 
reduction of Xf  and If . The latter can be interpreted in our model as a pro-innovation policy 
(i.e., a R&D grant). The outcomes of these policies are similar in the sense that a reduction of 
the fixed cost of trade or innovation can just expand the share of firms performing the related 
activity at the expense of the share of firms performing the other activity. 
 
If the sector-wide productivity is defined as the weighted average of all firms' 
productivity in the industry, with the weights consisting of the firm's market share, there are 
two sources of productivity growth at the industry level: changes in the firms' productivity or 
changes in the firms' market share. In Bartelsman et al.'s (2004) terminology, both the 
redistribution of market share from low to high productivity firms - the between-firm effect - 
and the technology adoption by some exporters - the within-firm effect - are contributing to the 
industry productivity growth in this equilibrium whenever free trade is introduced or 
transportation costs are reduced. 
 
 
5.2  Selection B 
 
In equilibrium B  ( ffIX ccc 0 ), some innovators are non-exporters. Therefore, the 
innovating firms are both of the I -type and of the XI -type, and pD(c0
f ) = 0, 
p I cI
f( ) =pD cIf( )  and pXI cX( ) = 0 define our cut-off conditions. The necessary and sufficient 
condition for this equilibrium to hold is 
 d fXt
s -1 ³ d fI
(g1- s - 1)
g1- s ³ g1- s fD. (17) 
From Table 1, we deduce that none of the pro-trade policies can stimulate innovation in the 
sense of leading to a higher share of innovating firms in the economy. Since the marginal 
innovator is a domestic firm, a reduction of   or Xf  has no direct effect on its profit, but it 
makes the profits of exporting firms bigger. Higher profits induce these firms to expand their 
activity abroad (either at the intensive or extensive margin), which causes labor demand and 
real wages to increase. The rise of production costs affects the non-exporters, including the 
marginal innovating firm, more severely. Those firms that cannot break even will be forced out 
of the market. In the new steady state more domestic firms will stick to the baseline technology 
(lower 
f
Ic ), and less firms will enter (lower 
fc0 ). Because market share is redistributed from 
low to high productivity firms and some firms give up technology adoption, it is clear that 
industry productivity can grow only because of the between-firm component. 
 
Note that in our model technology adoption occurs only at the extensive margin 
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because of the exogeneity of  . With an endogenous   and a convex cost of innovation, 
some of the XI firms, those that expand their activity abroad and enlarge their market shares, 
would find it optimal in this equilibrium to choose a lower   and, therefore, promote 
technology adoption at the intensive margin, too (Vannoorenberghe, 2008). 
 
It is instructive to graph the parameter space which sustains equilibria B  and BW . 
We represent each term of the inequalities (14) and (17) in Figure 1 as a function of an index of 
variable trade costs (
1 ). In the graph we omit the term Df
 1  as it is irrelevant for 
equilibrium B  provided it lies below the curves d fXt
s -1  andd fI / (g
1- s - 1). Condition (14) 
holds in the region labeled with BW  for transportation costs below 1 BW  and if n  is not too 
large. Likewise, condition (17) is satisfied in the region labeled with B  for transportation costs 
above 
1 B . Therefore, these two equilibria are not contiguous in this space, as no equilibrium 
is defined for intermediate values of  . Note that the size of this middle region crucially 
depends on the magnitudes of the fixed costs of trading and innovating as well as on the 
number of trading partners. 
 
INSERT Figure 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As transportation costs increase beyond 1 BW , firms in region BW  in Figure 1 regard 
exporting without innovating as unsustainable, but they cannot yet justify being domestic 
innovators until transportation costs have increased to at least 
1 B . Likewise, as 
transportation costs decrease below 
1 B , firms in region B  in the graph can no longer justify 
being innovators without exporting, but becoming exporters without innovating is equally no 
option until the transportation costs have fallen below 1 BW . Therefore, when transportation 
costs fall in this intermediate region, there is a profitable deviation from the strategy adopted 
in region BW  or B . In Figure 1, we label the region between 1 BW  and 
1 B  with the letter 
C , because it corresponds to the equilibrium described in Lileeva and Trefler (2010), where 
innovation and exporting are complementary activities in the sense that no firm will ever start 
one activity without performing the other, too. 
 
To develop the intuition, consider a domestic firm willing to both export and adopt the 
innovative technology. Such a strategy is wise if  
 
 npXI (c)+p I (c)[ ] - pD(c) = npXI (c)+p I (c)- npX (c)+pD(c)[ ] +npX (c) ³ 0, 
 
where the first equation is the profit differential from implementing both options at the same 
time compared to the profit earned on the domestic market. Note that for a firm with Xcc  
in equilibrium B , the first equation is necessarily positive as XIn  and DI    are positive. 
Likewise, for a firm with Icc  in equilibrium BW  this condition holds as the squared 
bracket and the last addend in the second equation are both positive. This is not surprising as 
 14 
we know that this kind of firm performs both activities in each equilibrium, respectively. Yet 
this condition could more generally hold in either equilibrium for other firms too, although all 
terms may not necessarily be positive. Indeed, a domestic firm would want to pursue a 
complementary strategy if the double option is also more profitable than just either exporting 
or innovating, so if  
 )()()()()()( cccncccn DDXDIXI    (18) 
and 
 ).()()()()( cccccn DIDIXI    (19) 
  
Equation (18) implies Bc1- s ³ d fI( ) / g1- s - 1( )éë ùû* 1/ 1+nt 1- s( )éë ùû, which evaluated at the 
marginal exporting firm with Xcc =  in equilibrium BW  translates into 
d fXt
s -1 ³ d fI( ) / g1- s - 1( )éë ùû* 1/ 1+nt 1- s( )éë ùû. For this parameter range the marginal exporting 
firm finds in the double option a profitable deviation. And so will all other firms with higher 
productivity. 
 
Equation (19) implies Bc1- s ³ d fXg
s -1t s -1, or for the marginal innovating firm at fIcc =  





1- s - 1( ) ³ d fX . Under these circumstances, the marginal 
innovating firm finds the double option more profitable, and so will all other firms with higher 
productivity. 
 
Therefore, only when transportation costs are sufficiently low - below 1 BW  - some 
firms find exporting to be more profitable than undertaking both investments simultaneously. 
Likewise, only for relatively high transportation costs - above 
1 B  - some firms innovate 
exclusively for the domestic market without seeking participation in foreign markets. In the 
intermediate range of transportation costs, when converging to this limiting zone from BW , 
no firms would ever export without innovating and would ever innovate without exporting like 
in B . Likewise, when converging to this limiting zone from B , one does not fall straight into 
BW , as no firm would ever export without innovating.  
 
We consider next the equilibrium where this double strategy or complementary strategy 
between innovating and exporting is optimal. 
 
 
5.3  Export and Innovate: complementary activities (selection C) 
 
The innovator and the exporter types coincide (
f
IX cc = ) because exporting and innovating are 
complementary activities.
11
 Rearranging (14) and (17), the parameter space that is 
complementary to both equilibria BW  and B  can be expressed as  
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(g1- s - 1)
1
(1+nt 1- s )
£d fXt
s -1 £ d fI
(g1- s - 1)
g1- s . 
 
We prove in the appendix that only under this parameter restriction can the strategy of 
innovating and exporting simultaneously be optimal. Not surprisingly, being the limiting case of 
both BW  and B , this condition is defined for transportation costs between the two other 
equilibria. 
 
Referring to Table 1 again, we note that because the activity of exporting and 
innovating are complementary, every pro-trade policy in this equilibrium is also a 
pro-innovation policy, and vice versa every pro-innovation policy is a pro-trade policy, too. In 
other words, innovation and trade policies become substitutes, in the sense they can used 
interchangeably to achieve the same policy aim. This feature distinguishes this equilibrium from 
the other two. 
 
 
6  The Policy Space 
 
Combining the information of Figure 1 and Table 1 is useful to provide a unified discussion of 
the effects of various policies, and to introduce the concept of policy space. 
 
Each equilibrium slices Figure 1 in three regions whose boundaries are entirely 
determined by the regulatory cost of trade and innovation. Therefore, differences in Xf  or 
If  across countries result in regions of different sizes. The variable costs of trade determine 
the region in which each country falls and, ultimately, the effects that trade and innovation 
policies have on the different cost cut-offs (Table 1). Because any changes to a "policy-triple" 
),,( IX ff  can be mapped into our parameter space, we refer to Figure 1 as the "policy space" 
of a country. 
 
A first implication is that a given policy impacts different economies differently: For 
example, a reduction of tariff lines increases the share of exporting and innovating firms in 
countries with low initial tariffs (region BW ), but reduces the share of innovators in countries 
with higher tariff levels (region B ). This is because the extensive margin of innovation ( fIc ) 
reacts positively in the first case and negatively in the second case (see Table 1). Likewise, an 
innovation policy reducing If  raises Xc  only for intermediate levels of trade protection 
(region C ), but lowers it in high or low trade cost situations (regions BW  and B ). This same 
policy has a differentiated outcome also for countries with similar levels of transportation costs. 
To illustrate this point, let us consider countries located in region BW  at the boundary with 
region C . A reduction of If  in Figure 1 has the effect of squeezing region BW  in favor of 
region C , as 1 BW  shifts to the left. This change, if sufficiently large, may push a country into 
region C , all else equal. In the new steady state, this policy raises the share of exporters. In a 
cross-country perspective, only countries which saw a change large enough to fall in the new 
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region experience a pro-trade policy; for the other countries, the movement of Xc  goes in the 
opposite direction. 
 
Applying a time series logic to this example brings us to a second implication, namely 
that the effects of a given policy mutate with time. If we assume that the reduction of If  
happens in two distinct periods of time rather than across two countries, and that only in the 
second period of time the equilibrium crossing occurs, the outcome of the policy will be 
pro-trade in the second period but not in the first period. 
 
A third implication is that policy makers face different policy trade-offs in the three 
regions. It is apparent from Table 1 that equilibrium C  is trade-off free, because both 
innovation and trade policies increase the share of firms that export and innovate in the 
economy. In equilibrium BW  this is only true for a reduction of the level of tariffs, since all 
other instruments increase the share of firms performing one activity, but reduce the share of 
firms performing the other activity. Finally, all policy instruments in equilibrium B  involve 
some sort of trade-off in terms of the activities they promote and harm. 
 
We now discuss the extent to which policy makers can alleviate these trade-offs by 
introducing policy coordination among different instruments. Let us consider in Figure 1 a 
country in region B , at the border with region C , which aims at incentivizing the adoption of 
the more productive technology. In this region, the only means to achieve this goal is a 
reduction of If . This policy, however, also has the secondary effect of pushing the country 
deeper into region B , as the boundary to region C  moves to the left. At each attempt of 
increasing the share of innovating firms by resorting repeatedly to this type of policy, the share 
of exporting firms will drop even further. Unfortunately, counterbalancing this effect with the 
subsequent use of trade policy would not yield the desired effect either, but would only nullify 
the effects obtained with the innovation policy.
12
 The graph suggests that a different strategy 
centered on a different policy mix could prove to be more beneficial in this circumstance. 
Reducing first either the tariff or the regulatory costs of trade would tend to push this country 
toward region C  instead. After the transition to the new region, these same trade policies 
would also favor innovation. Furthermore, the implementation of innovation policies would no 
longer entail any trade-off in terms of exporting activities. 
 
A similar policy dilemma concerns a country that in Figure 1 is located at the left border 
of region BW . Such a country has exhausted its possibility to resort to tariff cuts to sustain 
both trade and innovation, as it approaches 1= . Without the tariff instrument at its disposal, 
policy makers can either sustain innovators (by reducing If ) but hurt exporters, or sustain 
exporters (by lowering Xf ) and hurt innovators. And using the two policies sequentially is only 
detrimental as they tend to cancel each other out. If instead this country were at the other 
extreme of the same region, bordering on region C , it would not face any immediate policy 
                                                     
12
 Note that we cannot here discuss the effects of using innovation and trade policies simultaneously. Table 2 indeed summarizes only the 
partial derivatives, not the cross-derivatives. 
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trade-offs. Tariff cuts could indeed be used to increase both the proportion of firms that adopt 
new technologies and the proportion of firms that export. However, if this country were to 
pursue this policy repeatedly, it would slide toward the left end of this region and progressively 
exhaust its degrees of freedom. Starting instead by lowering If , it could find itself in region 
C,  as this region expands and region BW  contracts. And in the new steady state of region 
C,  pro-innovation policies are also pro-trade policies, and vice versa.  
 
In conclusion, the graph clearly shows two results. First, the boundaries and the size of 
each region potentially differ across countries. For this reason alone, countries with similar 
levels of transport costs may nevertheless be in different regions, thus experiencing different 
outcomes from the same policies. Second, depending on the current level of trade costs, the 
order in which policies are implemented matters for their final outcomes. Interestingly, putting 
both these results together, it is possible to reach two apparently antithetic conclusions: The 
same tariff cut may impact countries with similar levels of tariff protection differently and 
countries with different levels of tariff protection similarly. Indeed, think of two countries in 
Figure 1 having different region boundaries and the same level of transportation costs. It is then 
possible that they fall into two different regions and face heterogeneous responses to the same 
policy. Likewise, it is possible that two countries with different transportation costs and 
different region boundaries fall in the same equilibrium and have identical responses to the 
same policy. 
 
Moreover, when policy makers can resort to multiple instruments, the choice they make 
in the first place affects the effectiveness of future policy options and the prospective policy 
trade-offs. In the examples above, some types of policies had undesirable effects which could 
be avoided with an alternative sequence of policies. In this sense, the model justifies the recent 
OECD emphasis on the desirability of coordination among trade and innovation policies.
13
 But 
it also highlights the fact that the level of coordination needed is heterogeneous and depends 
upon the level of trade costs. The graph and the discussion above suggest that in low trade-cost 
situations innovation policies, eventually followed by trade policies, are beneficial to avoid 
さヮﾗﾉｷI┞ デヴ;SW-ﾗaaゲざ. In high trade-cost situations, the opposite order of policies seems more 
appropriate. Finally, with an intermediate level of trade costs, coordination is not stringent. 
 
Our discussion so far has abstracted from institutional, administrative, or budget 
constraints that may limit policy makers' actions. For instance, it can be argued that the 
institutional context for the approval of innovation and trade policies is radically different in 
most European countries. Provided they comply with European laws, innovation policies are 
largely a national matter, whereas changes in trade policies fall under the competence of the 
European Union or the WTO. Considering in Figure 1 a country positioned in region B  at the 
border with region C , we have argued that pursuing trade policies in the first place was 
preferable to pursuing innovation policies. However, this conclusion does not take into account 
whether this strategy was institutionally feasible, nor whether it was the most cost-effective. 
While we feel that all these elements elevate the discussion of policy coordination, analyzing 
                                                     
13
 See Onodera (2008) for a recent OECD discussion, and OECD (2009). 
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them in this framework requires the additional introduction of an endogenous public sector, 
which is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, in the next section we shall briefly 
discuss the conditions under which the types of innovation and trade policies considered are 
welfare enhancing, thus providing governments with a rationale for introducing them. 
 
Finally, our results are based on a comparative static analysis between three different 
steady states and three different policies considered one at a time. It is undeniable that 
analyzing multiple policy scenarios and/or characterizing the transitional dynamic between 
different states should also become a prerogative for future research on the comparative 
analysis of different policy mixes across countries. 
 
 
7  Trade and the moments of the productivity distribution 
 
The redistribution of market share from exiting aｷヴﾏゲ デﾗ ｷﾐI┌ﾏHWﾐデ aｷヴﾏゲ ふデｴW さHWデ┘WWﾐざ 
component) contributes to increase the average productivity in the industry. Indeed, to a 
higher fc0  corresponds a higher truncation point of the lower tail of the productivity 
distribution )(G  and therefore a higher mean. But whether the average productivity will 
ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW ;ﾉゲﾗ SWヮWﾐSゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW さ┘ｷデｴｷﾐざ IﾗﾏヮﾗﾐWﾐデく Oﾐﾉ┞ ┘ｴWﾐ ; ｴｷｪｴWヴ ゲｴ;ヴW ﾗa aｷヴﾏゲ ;Sﾗヮデゲ 
the innovative technology can the first moment admittedly increase. This is a different 
prediction from the Melitz's (2003) model wheヴW デｴW さ┘ｷデｴｷﾐざ WaaWIデ ｷゲ ;HゲWﾐデ ;ﾐS デヴ;SW 
unambiguously increases the average productivity. Likewise, the prediction of our model for 
the second moment of the distribution differs from Melitz (2003). While in the latter a higher 
productivity truncation point associated with trade necessarily translates into a lower variance 
of the productivity distribution, in our model this effect is counterbalanced in some equilibria 
by the within-firm effect. Firms introducing the new technologies indeed contribute to widening 
the variance of the distribution. 
 
This means that the different policies we have analyzed will also have different effects 
on the moments of the productivity distribution, and these effects will depend on the current 
さﾏｷ┝ざ ﾗa ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ;SﾗヮデWSく 
 
 
8  Welfare implications of policies 
 
So far, we have considered policies as a fait accompli and focused on their outcomes. In this 
section, we briefly analyze the normative implications of adopting these policies to legitimize 
their adoption by governments. 
 
We take the indirect utility function PRU /=  as the measure of a country's welfare. 
This expression can be conveniently reduced to 
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,  (20) 
 
which shows that the entry cost cut-off 0c  is a sufficient statistic to evaluate the welfare 
impact of a policy. Given that all trade liberalization and innovation policies considered above 
lower the entry cut-off (Table 1), they are all welfare enhancing. 
 
The main reason behind this result is that these policies reduce the price index (i.e., 
greater efficiency). 
 
While all policies are welfare-enhancing, without further assumptions on the 
productivity distribution, we are unable to offer a proper welfare ranking of these policies. This 
ranking is influenced by the outcome of each policy on the different cost cut-offs and will 
change across the different regions of Figure 1. Consequently, the discussion above about the 
different trade-offs faced by the policy makers in terms of the share of firms performing a given 
activity is still relevant from a policy perspective. Moreover, even if all policies are welfare 
enhancing, our discussion of the policy space emphasizes that these policies have distinct 




Discussing the policy space above, we have interpreted reductions in transportation 
costs as comparable to tariff cuts. This comparison is appropriate as far as the positive effects 
of tariffs are concerned. In fact, an iceberg transport cost affects production costs exactly as the 
imposition of a comparable tariff would,
15
 but it does not generate any additional government 
revenues. However, when we consider that these revenues are redistributed to consumers in a 
lump-sum fashion, as is standard in the literature, consumers' and firms' optimal choices are 
not distorted by this redistribution. In this case it can be shown that the effects of trade and 
innovation policies on the productivity cut-offs (and indirectly on the share of exporting and 
innovating firms) are exactly the same as in the case of iceberg transport costs. 
 
 
9  Technological Spillovers 
 
The existence of technological spillovers constitutes an important element in standard 
innovation and technology adoption models (Romer, 1986; Romer, 1990; Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; and more recently Acemoglu et al., 2006; Keller, 2004; 
Impulliti and Licandro, 2011).
16
 In addition, the "new new trade" literature has found empirical 
support for the existence of export spillovers and these have recently been incorporated in 
                                                     
14
 To properly account for the impact of these distributional effects we should extend our model to a heterogeneous agent environment. This 
is a fruitful avenue for further research. 
15
 See Schroder and Sorensen (2014) for a specific definition of this type of tariff and the effects of different tariff policies on welfare in the 
Melitz's (2003) model. 
16
 Teece (1977) finds that the cost of technology transfer across countries for multinational firms clearly declines with measures of experience 
with the technology transferred in the industry. 
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theoretical models (Rauch and Watson, 2003; Krautheim, 2012). In this section, we show that 
the main results about the inter-connection between trade and innovation policies are robust 
to the existence of these technological spillovers. 
 
Following the paper by Krautheim (2012) we consider the notion that current exporters 
and innovators benefit from the investment in export/innovation that other firms are 
undertaking at the moment. More precisely, the fixed cost of either innovation or exporting is 
given by the following functional form: 
 














where the fixed cost for each activity depends on an invariant cost which varies across 
activities ( )i  and the technological spillover (the element in parentheses in the right-hand 
side of the equation). Notice that this cost declines with the proportion of firms in the current 
activity status; that is, the larger the proportion of exporters (innovators) in an industry the 
smaller is the fixed cost of exporting (innovating).
17
 i  is a technological constant, reflecting 
differences in the effectiveness of technological spillovers across activities, and   is the speed 
of learning which is common across activities. We assume that   is sufficiently low as in 
Krautheim (2012) to focus on interior solutions.  
 
Consider the case in which the economy is already open to trade. Solving for each type 
of equilibria, we can again distinguish three different cases, which are characterized by the 
conditions provided in Table 2. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
 
If we recall   ,=~ iiif    the equations displayed in Table 2 are very similar to the 
corresponding ones in a model without spillover (see Table A1 in the appendix). The regions in 
which each of the different types of equilibria occur clearly do not depend on the exponent 
associated with the relative productivity cut-offs, and consequently Figure 1 remains 
unaltered.
18
 It could also be shown that the sign of each of the derivatives computed in the 
new specification exhibits exactly the same sign, provided that these derivatives are computed 




 Knowledge spillovers in our economy affect our conclusions in 
quantitative terms but not in qualitative terms.
20
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 We assume that the technological spillover element depends on the proportion rather than the number of firms in the current activity status 
to avoid the traditional scale effect problem found in early innovation models: The possibility that population size affects the industry's average 
productivity. 
18
 The additional necessary conditions for equilibrium C to exist also holds in this context. 
19
 Results available upon request. 
20
 For example the existence of technological spillovers clearly reduces the distance between the different productivity cut-offs across 
equilibria cI / cX( ), cX / c0( )éë ùû. It is, however, challenging to offer an idea on the magnitude in each of the productivity cut-offs without 
considering a specific functional form for the productivity distribution of firms. 
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10  Conclusion 
 
To examine the scope for innovation policy as a stimulus to both innovation and trade, we 
include the option of technology adoption in a workhorse trade model with firm heterogeneity. 
Leaving aside any discussion of whether the notion of productivity-enhancing investment is the 
same thing as innovation, this model is capable of unifying several empirical scenarios, in which 
innovating non-exporters and exporting non-innovators are represented. These scenarios can 
be ordered along an increasing measure of countries' degree of protectionism. 
 
We propose a comparative analysis of policies aiming at reducing the variable costs of 
trade, the regulatory costs of trade (fixed cost of exporting), and the fixed costs of innovation. 
The outcomes of interest are the shares of both innovating and exporting firms. Whenever the 
share of the latter declines in response to an innovation policy, this policy cannot stimulate 
trade. This is the case for the most liberal or protectionist countries. The mirror channel is the 
influence of trade liberalization on innovation. 
 
The interplay between the two channels leads to a number of results. First, the policy 
that stimulates one activity (e.g., trade policy) can be counter-productive for the other activity 
(e.g., innovation) under certain circumstances (e.g., high trade costs). Second, the "initial 
condition" in a country (i.e., trade openness) determines the impact of a given policy. Third, the 
order in which policies are implemented matters for the future efficacy of policies and is 
important in order to mitigate policy trade-offs. 
 
The paper has abstracted from the realistic consideration that policies are typically 
costly to implement. Costly could mean "institutionally" costly, in the sense that legal 
constraints increase the cost of a policy change; or, "administratively" costly, so that the choice 
of a policy is dictated by cost-efficiency reasons. Incorporating these considerations requires a 
framework with an endogenous public sector, certainly an interesting and relevant avenue for a 
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.1  Appendix A - Definitions 
 
In this section we focus only on the open economy scenario. For a description of the closed 
economy scenario see the online appendix pubblished at: (forthcoming). 
 
Open economy  
For deriving the aggregate properties of the model, the cost distributions should be defined for 
each type of equilibria, since innovators and exporters price differently than domestic firms and 
the sorting process changes with each type of equilibria. 
 
Equilibrium BW  










































































denote the cost distributions in each subgroup prior to innovation.  
Let   and  be the 
respective average productivities for domestic firms, innovators, and exporting non-innovators 
prior to innovation. 
 
Aggregate variables 
Analogous to the closed economy version we obtain  where 
 is again the weighted 
average productivity index of the economy. As in the closed economy it can be shown that 
  (21) 
 












nd fX.  (22) 
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Equilibrium B  
In equilibrium B all exporters are innovators, but not all innovators are exporters. There is a 
subset of domestic firms which also innovate. To derive the aggregate properties of the model, 
















































































Then we have 
  
where ,  






ò c  and  As in the equilibrium BW  
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determine the unique equilibrium. For latter proofs it is also useful to express the 
productivity cut-off as 
 





















Equilibrium C  
In equilibrium C all exporters are innovators, and all innovators are exporters. The conditional 
productivity distributions of exporters and innovators prior to innovation are the same. The 
expression for the aggregate price index now becomes: 
  
where , and the relationships  
 































and since 1.==  hcc IX  As in equilibrium BW  (21), (22), (23) are easily derived. For the 
next propositions we are able to express the ZP condition in all three equilibria as 
























































=)( .  
This productivity distribution corresponds to the incumbent productivity distribution prior to 




























and therefore these functions are monotonically increasing in their respective 

























































These results will be useful in the following section. A summary of the results are 















































































































Table A1: Equilibria without technological spillovers 
 
 
.2  Appendix B - Parameter restriction for equilibrium C  
 
In equilibrium C , firms consider the joint option of exporting and innovating. According to 
what is derived in section 3.3, no firm will innovate without being an exporter, and no firm will 
export without being an innovator. The firm evaluates whether to export and innovate is better 
than not doing both and remain local. The partition in this equilibrium is between exporting and 
innovating firms, and local firms. Let us call .... golwcI  the marginal cost associated with the 
firm which is indifferent between both options. 
 
Then this marginal firm will satisfy the following condition: 
      0=)()(1 1111 DfIDXIfI fcBfnffcBn      
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   ).(=1))((1 111 XIfI nffcBn      
 




































The previous equation guarantees that not all firms innovate and export. However, for 
equilibrium C  to exist, the marginal firm must be indifferent between innovating and 
exporting or being local. This implies that the income of the marginal firm in equilibrium C  
must be larger than the income of this firm when it innovates, provided that the firm will be an 
exporter, or when it exports, provided that the firm will be an innovator. In other terms:  














cB IfI  (27) 
 
   .111     XfI fcB  (28) 
 
The marginal firm in equilibrium C  has the following income: 
















cB XIfI  (29) 
 

















nff IXI  
 
Rearranging terms in the latter equation, we have 
 
          .11111 1111111 IIXII fnfnfnnfnf      
 
Rearranging terms, we have 
    0,11 111     nfnnf XI  
and then this implies 











f IX  
 
This is one of the restrictions needed to be satisfied if equilibrium C  holds. 

















Rearranging terms, we have 
 ,111     XXXXI ffnffnf  
 
and this implies 
 ,111     XXI fff  
 
which implies 
 ).(1 11     XI ff  
 













which is the other requirement for equilibrium C  to hold. 
 
 
.3  Appendix C - Proof of Propositions. 
 
Proposition 1 (Trade Liberalization: Equilibrium BW): Trade Liberalization yields the following 
results: 





 Xc  0<

 fIc  

























Proof. 1. A tariff reduction: 
 
Totally differentiate (25) with respect to :  



























cjf  (30) 
where, as described above, ),,,,,(= 0  XD
f
X ffcfc   ),,,,,,,(= 0  nffcgc ID
ff
I   
).,,,,,(=  nffchc XIX
f








































































































































I =  























chh fI  where 































































To get the sign of the derivative of 
























































































Substituting the expression for 






















































































































































































Substituting the expressions )( 0
f'
D cj , )( X
'
X cj , we have that 
        ,~>~ 1010 XXff cGccGc    






   
since .< 0
f
X cc  
 
2. A decrease in :Xf  
Totally differentiating (25) with respect to Xf , we find that 































   (31) 















































































































































which is always satisfied. 




































































































































Proposition 2 Trade Liberalization (Equilibrium B ) : Trade Liberalization experiments in this 
equilibrium yields the following results: 





 Xc  0>

 fIc  

























Proof. The Proof follows the same scheme as the previous proof. However, we know that now 
the equations determining the cut-offs have changed and then we have that 
),,,,(= 0  X
f
X fcfc
   ),,,,,,(= 0 DI
ff
I ffcgc 






1. Tariff policy: 













































































































































































but we know that: 0=

 g











 fIc  
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i cccc  The 
partial derivatives mentioned above are the same in both equilibria BW and B; therefore the 
same proof applies.   
 
Proposition 3 (Trade Liberalization. Equilibrium C): Trade Liberalization experiments in this 
equilibrium yield the following results: 





 Xc  0<

 fIc  

























Proof. The proof is analogous to the other type of equilibria. It is important to remember 
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1. Tariff policy: 
Totally differentiating (25) we get 




































































































































I cc  To obtain the sign of this derivative, we first 



























































































Rearranging terms it can be shown that this expression is negative whenever the following 
holds: 






















2. Export regulation costs: 




























































































which clearly holds as we have shown in previous sections. 







































































Proposition 4 (Innovation policies). A reduction in the costs of innovation reduces the export 
cut-off( )Xc  and the domestic cut-off ( )Xc . It increases the innovation cut-off  fIc .  
 
Proof. Equilibrium BW 
























































   


















































































































































































































































































































































Rearranging terms we arrive at the following expression: 



























which clearly holds. 
 
Equilibrium B  
Differentiating 





































 Then the results are analogous to the 
ones in equilibrium BW. The proof is also analogous. 
 
Equilibrium C  
Differentiating 

























Remember that in Equilibrium C ).(=)( fIIXX cjcj  Differentiating (25) with respect to If , we 
get 
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 we apply the chain 























































































































































Table 1: The Policy Matrix 
BW   fc0   Xc   
f
Ic   




   0<
 Xc    0<

 fIc   
















































B   fc0   Xc   
f
Ic   




   0<
 Xc    0>

 fIc   
















































C   fc0   Xc   
f
Ic   




   0<
 Xc    0<

 fIc   
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